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Figure 1 appears at the end of the paper.1
1 Questions addressed
The main purpose of the proposed research is to investigate the effects of the food
subsidy offered through the public distribution system (PDS) on childhood malnutrition
in India. This has not been done before. It is of immediate policy interest both with
respect to the unusually high incidence of malnutrition in India, and with respect to the
current re-shaping of the PDS. For this, we use a recent household survey that contains
information on grain bought on the PDS and on the open market, anthropometric
indicators for child health and a rich set of socio-economic and demographic variables
pertaining to rural households in India in the mid-1990s.
In the course of addressing the main question, our research will illuminate the following
questions. First, there is the interesting and difficult question of estimating the
counterfactual: Do users of the PDS buy more food than they would if they did not face
a subsidy? How much more? Second, there is the often neglected question of
inequalities in the within-household distribution of food. This paper investigates
whether there are gender inequalities in the gains accruing to a household on account of
a food subsidy. Third, there is the question of how health is produced. Does food
matter? Does income matter at a given level of food expenditure? Or do factors like
maternal health largely pre-determine nutritional status and morbidity risk? The paper
quantifies the role of food expenditure in producing changes in child health indicators
such as height and weight for age.
2 Motivation
There is a very high incidence of child malnutrition in India, estimated at 66 per cent in
1998 for children under 5 (World Development Indicators, World Bank 1998a). The all-
India figures on malnutrition conceal enormous variation across the regions of India, a
fact that the proposed analysis will exploit, given that there are also remarkable
variations in access to and usage of the public distribution system through which food
subsidies are made available to households in India. The incidence of malnutrition has
been declining but not as rapidly as recent economic growth in India may lead us to
expect. Malnutrition is concentrated amongst the poor and the fact that it can impair
productive activity and educational achievement creates a poverty trap that can
perpetuate itself across generations An intriguing fact about malnutrition is that it is not
limited to the poor. Indeed, about 70 per cent of individuals are estimated to be
malnourished in India as compared with the 30 per cent that have incomes below the
poverty line (e.g. Suryanarayana 2001, Swaminathan 2000).1
The Human Poverty Index introduced in the Human Development Report (UNDP 1997)
includes the percentage of malnourished children under five. As a result, the regular
ranking of countries in terms of human development now partly reflects the extent of
1 The most likely explanation of this is that the poverty-line is calorie-based and adequate nutrition
requires more than calories. Since the relative prices of foods rich in proteins and in vitamins and
minerals are relatively high, it may not be so surprising that a large fraction of households with
incomes above the poverty line cannot afford to balance their diets.2
child malnutrition. Malnutrition is an intrinsic component of well-being and an
important index of human welfare, known to predispose a child towards morbidity and
mortality (e.g. Gómez et al. 2000, Rice et al. 2000) and low levels of educational
attainment (Glewwe and Jacoby 1995) and productivity (see Dasgupta 1993).
What can be done to address this problem? To the extent that the problem reflects
inadequate access to food, a government distribution network that incorporates a food
subsidy would appear to be an appropriate intervention. India’s public distribution
system (PDS), which has been around since the Bengal Famine of 1943 is precisely
such an intervention. Until recently, it offered a universal entitlement to a food subsidy
to all citizens of the country. In the last decade, fiscal constraints have precipitated path-
breaking changes in the system. It is now targeted at the poor. Some argue that it should
be phased out as it is not only unaffordable but also inefficient, whilst others argue that
it is crucial for food security in India. This paper offers new insights relevant to this
ongoing debate on the public distribution system. It also contributes to the literature on
child health in India.
3 The fiscal context of the food subsidy
Following some tentative steps towards economic liberalisation in the 1980s, India
embarked on a programme of economic reform in 1991 with the objective of achieving
macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment, the latter being closely tied to
getting prices right. Both processes encourage government expenditure reduction and
the removal of subsidies. In this context, the PDS has commanded considerable
attention. It has been argued that it is an obsolescent and fiscally unsustainable
institution (e.g. Umali-Deiringer and Deiringer 2001, World Bank 1998b,
Radhakrishnan and Subbarao 1997). These authors have typically also argued that the
PDS has a poor record of reaching the poor. Hence the move towards slimming the
system and targeting the subsidy at the poor. This done, there is still a view that the PDS
should be phased out and replaced with more effective instruments for reaching the
poor. Others (e.g. Mooij 1994, Swaminathan 2000) see these changes of content and
tone as indicators of the general weakening of welfare systems in the context of
economic liberalisation. They argue that it is an important safety net for the poor, most
likely to be useful in the current context of deregulation and inflation.
How large a fiscal burden does the PDS impose? What is the current situation? The cost
of the food subsidy in the Central Government budget is argued to have increased
substantially since the mid-1980s. For example, it increased from Rs. 6.5 billion (0.5 per
cent of GDP) in 1980–81 to Rs. 18 billion (0.7 per cent of GDP) in 1993–94 (see
Table 1). Table 2 shows Central Plan budgetary expenditures on the PDS relative to
other welfare expenditures. The central food subsidy is augmented by further subsidies
offered by some state governments such as those of Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and
Karnataka (Radhakrishna and Subbarao 1997, p.1). For comparison, it is interesting to
note that public expenditures on health and education as a percentage of GDP and GNP
respectively were 0.7 per cent and 3.8 per cent in 1990–96 (World Bank 1998b). The
increasing fiscal cost of the PDS has been reflected in higher procurement and issue
prices of rice and wheat in the 1990s. With the consequent shrinking of the difference
between PDS and open market prices, consumers have begun to shift from the PDS to3
the open market. At the same time, farmers have been keen to supply grain to the Food
Corporation of India (FCI),2 given the generous minimum support price offered to
producers. As a result, the FCI has bought more foodgrain than it can manage, resulting
in a huge increase in the cost of holding buffer stocks (which is counted as part of the
cost of the food subsidy). The recommended stock of foodgrain on 1 July of every year
is 22.3m tonnes of which 12.3m tonnes is the PDS requirement and 10m tonnes is
retained as insurance against fluctuations in food production. In July 1995, the FCI had
a foodgrain stock of 35.6m tonnes, which implied an increase in carrying cost of 78 per
cent!
Table 1
Central Government expenditure on the food subsidy




1974 4238 0.44 3.01
1975 3688 0.35 2.08
1976 7029 0.66 3.85
1977 6276 0.55 3.20
1978 7316 0.61 3.22
1979 6689 0.58 3.24
1980 6500 0.53 2.89
1981 6349 0.49 2.76
1982 5961 0.45 2.33
1983 6466 0.45 2.32
1984 7927 0.53 2.51
1985 11032 0.71 3.11
1986 12511 0.77 3.12
1987 11506 0.68 2.84
1988 11703 0.63 2.70
1989 12172 0.61 2.60
1990 10863 0.52 2.33
1991 11018 0.53 2.53
1992 9903 0.45 2.22
1993 17871 0.78 3.80
1994 14920 0.61 3.01
Source: FCI Performance Budget documents & Economic Survey, GOI, several years.
2 The FCI is the central body responsible for procuring and distributing grain under the Public
Distribution System.4
Table 2
Anti-poverty programmes: central plan budgetary expenditure
Figures are percentages of total expenditure















1990 2.3 1.9 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.3 5.3 6.4
1991 2.6 1.6 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.4 5.3 6.6
1992 2.3 2.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.4 5.6 6.7
1993 3.9 2.8 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.4 8.0 9.4
1994 3.2 2.9 0.4 0.9 0.0 0.5 7.9 9.3
1995 3.0 2.7 0.4 0.8 0.0 0.4 7.3 8.9
1996 3.0 2.5 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.4 7.0 8.9
1997 3.2 2.3 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.3 6.7 8.9
Source: World Bank (1997, Table 4.1), based on GOI data. Rural employment programmes include JRY,
EAS, IAY and MWS. Basic needs programmes include outlays for elementary and adult
education, accelerated rural and urban water supply and sanitation, child welfare (including the
midday meals programme) and backward area development programmes (drought prone,
desert, wastelands). APP is anti-poverty programmes.
4 The public distribution system in India
The rural Indian population spends about 64 per cent of its budget on food. Foodshare is
an (inverse) indicator of welfare (e.g. Deaton 1997): it follows that food security should
be a major focus of policies concerned with wellbeing in this society. In terms of both
coverage and public expenditure, the most important instrument of the Indian state in
the area of health and nutrition policy is the Public Distribution System (PDS). Of the
200 million tonnes of foodgrain produced in 1999–2000, about 29 million tonnes were
procured by the government under the PDS, which now supports the largest network of
‘fair price shops’ in the world (4.5 lakh outlets in 1999). These provide rice, wheat,
sugar, edible oil, soft cake and kerosene oil at subsidised prices. The PDS is managed
by state governments which, to varying degrees, also supply other commodities such as
pulses, salt and coarse clothing. The central government determines the total
procurement of foodgrains and their allocation across states. The state government then
determines the off-take, public distribution, the list of commodities provided, and retail
prices (Bapna 1990). Food security falls under the Directive Principles of State Policy in
India’s federal structure. Locations of the fair price shops through which the subsidised
items are sold are determined by officials at the district level, taking account of village
size and ‘suitability’ (Suryanarayana 1996). There is enormous variation in the density
of fair price shops as also in the regularity of supplies both across and within states.5
It has a long history. Quantity rationing of essential commodities was introduced in
India in the inter-war period and the PDS took shape soon after the Bengal Famine in
1943. It evolved in the 1950s and 1960s as a mechanism for providing price support to
producers at the same time as providing a food subsidy to consumers. This was a time
when the country was threatened by national-level food shortages and there was rapid
food price inflation, especially in urban areas. By the 1980s, India had generated a
surplus of foodgrains and the incidence of poverty had declined progressively from
about 50 per cent in the 1960s to about 30 per cent in the 1990s. As a result, the welfare
component of the PDS gained strength in the 1980s, when it was considerably extended
to rural areas and tribal blocks, with an explicit view to reaching areas of high poverty
incidence. In the context of currency devaluation and economic reform in the 1990s,
procurement and issue prices of PDS commodities were increased and the government
sought to mitigate adverse welfare consequences by better targeting of PDS supplies at
the poor. Until 1992, there was universal entitlement to the PDS but it has since been
restructured. In 1992, the subsidy on foodgrains was increased for people in tribal,
drought-prone and desert areas (spread over 1775 blocks). This was called the
Revamped PDS or RPDS. In 1997, it was replaced by the Targeted PDS or the TPDS in
which targeting was shifted from poor regions to poor households and the subsidy
differential between the poor and the non-poor was widened. More specifically, 10 kg
of foodgrain were available at a highly subsidised price per family per month for
families below the poverty line. This tendency was pushed further in the year 2000,
since when families below the poverty line were are offered 20 kg per month at half the
economic cost while all other families are required to pay the economic cost (see
Government of India 2000). So the subsidy to the poor is indexed to costs. And those
classified as non-poor now get no subsidy (unless they live in drought-prone areas, in
which case they get the 50 per cent subsidy that the poor get) though they are served by
fair price shops, which can play a useful distributional function in areas where private
shops have not emerged.
5 A preliminary assessment of the debate
It is not the main purpose of this paper to assess the overall viability or relative
effectiveness of the PDS. However, in order to motivate this paper, we present in this
section an overview of the recent debate that recent reforms (indicated in the preceding
section) have generated. This will set the question we ask in a policy context.
Arguments in favour of a severe trimming down of the PDS are of two sorts, and it is
important to distinguish between them. One is that it is too great a fiscal strain. This
argument often rests on indications of how the PDS is inefficiently run, which means
that it imposes an unjustifiable fiscal strain (see Dev and Suryanarayana 1991,
Swaminathan 2000). For example, there is evidence of leakages- of subsidised grain
being diverted to the open market for profit. It has also been argued that meeting the
cereal needs of the poor in India requires a budgetary commitment that is simply too
large (Geetha and Suryanaryana 1993). The estimates themselves deserve closer
consideration, especially as other research has estimated that the cost of achieving
calorie adequacy is a trivial fraction of the household budget (see Deaton and
Subramaniam 1996). Also, such a claim needs to be investigated in relation to the entire
programme of public spending. The discussion should clearly indicate whether the
argument is about cutting the share of social spending or about allocating a given or6
greater share amongst alternative programmes. This is beyond the scope of the current
paper. Some discussion of alternative programmes is in Radhakrishna and Subbarao
(1997) and Chatterjee and Measham (1997), both World Bank publications.3 There
remains considerable scope for tightening the analysis.
The second argument adduced to support a narrowing of the scope of the PDS is that it
is not progressive: it is argued to have failed in many states to provide nutritional
support to the poor. This argument is made, for example, in Parikh (1994) where
aggregate data are tabulated to show that the participation rate in the PDS is similar
across income groups. This sort of analysis has influenced opinion against support for
the PDS and it has been argued that other schemes such as food-for-work programmes
are more progressive because the non-poor will tend to select themselves out of
participation in a programme that offers a low wage and requires work (e.g. World Bank
1998b). However, this argument seems flawed unless it can be shown that the PDS is
non-progressive after controlling for access. Suppose that within a given region where
programme access is similar across households, the poor utilise the PDS more than the
non-poor. It seems plausible that the non-poor will select themselves out of the scheme
on account of the poor quality of grain that is supplied through it or else on account of
having to queue for supplies. Within regions, then, we may conclude that the
programme is progressive. Suppose, however, that the location of fair price shops or the
delivery of regular supplies favours relatively rich regions, say, on account of political
lobbying or because transport costs are lower (poorer regions tend to be more remote).
Then taking aggregate data and failing to control for programme access, the programme
may appear to be non-progressive when in fact it is not. So access is key and analysis of
micro-data, controlling for access, is warranted. The regional distribution of the PDS
has in fact been very uneven, there being a greater density of fair price shops in urban
than in rural areas (e.g. Howes and Jha 1992) and, this aside, a much better developed
distribution network in some states than in others (see Table 3).4 As the states with a
weak PDS are relatively poor states and as the poor are disproportionately located in
rural areas, access has disfavoured the poor5. In summary, if the programme is pro-poor
conditional on access then the role for policy is to expand access. This is distinct from
searching for alternative pro-poor programmes on the grounds that the PDS is inherently
unprogressive.
In defence of the PDS and, especially, its role in supporting food security for the poor,
the following four arguments can be distinguished. First, even if entitlement were
universal as was the case until 1992, some degree of progressivity is likely to have been
introduced by (a) self-selection, as discussed above, and (b) by virtue of the fact that the
3 Radhakrishnan and Subbarao (1997) estimate the cost per unit of income or nutritional gain under the
PDS, and compare this with other anti-poverty programmes in India, concluding that the PDS is
considerably less cost-effective than the JRY, MEDS or ICDS.
4 Diversity in the experience of states is valuable in illustrating the potential of the PDS. In Kerala, for
example, delivery functions without too much malpractice and utilization is nearly universal.
5 In the sample of rural households analysed in this paper, about 34 per cent of all households report
buying grain on the PDS in the preceding month and this percentage is similar among the non-poor
and the poor. Since access is regionally differentiated, it may be the case (for example) that most non-
poor households have access and 66 per cent self-select themselves out of the scheme whereas only
about 34 per cent of poor households have access and most of them use the PDS. No previous
research has attempted to distinguish between self-selection and programme selection.7
poor spend a larger fraction of their budget on food than the rich. Second, the
(centralised) PDS plays a critical distributional function that ongoing reforms in India
need to be careful to protect. The grain distributed under the PDS is regularly procured
by the government from farmers at a supported price and a certain (large) fraction is
held as a buffer stock. This is available to smooth supply and stabilise prices in response
to fluctuations in production. For example, in 1979 and 1987, years of low production,
PDS supplies were considerably higher than usual. In both these years, the government
increased supply through employment programmes located in distressed areas (see
Radhakrishnan and Subbarao 1997). In the extreme, PDS reserves are available for the
central government to react to regional crises created by drought or flood, for example
(see Besley and Burgess 2001) for evidence that it does react in this way). A third
problem with cutting back the PDS or narrowing its reach to the income-poor is that of
physical access to food. By virtue of building fair price shops, the PDS has, at least in
some states, significantly improved access in some of the more remote and
economically underdeveloped regions where the market has yet to penetrate. Indeed, in
the 1980s, the rural network of PDS supplies expanded considerably (be there much
scope for improvement). As Sen (1981, for example) has emphasized, aggregate
availability is not enough to avoid food deprivation when distribution is uneven. And
distribution does not just involve purchasing power but also an effective delivery system
(see Venugopal 1992).6 These arguments militate against narrowing the scope of the
PDS down to those classified as income poor. Fourth, the proportion of people below
the poverty line is considerably smaller than the proportion malnourished. In
1999/2000, poverty incidence is estimated to have been 26 per cent (e.g. Sundaram
2001), while malnutrition is estimated to have been about 70 per cent around 1998
(World Bank 1998a). This is not implausible since the non-poor may, for example, be
calorie-adequate but not able to afford balanced nutrition and build disease resistance.
In this context, it is relevant that the income distribution in India is highly skewed, so
that a large slice of society above the poverty line is not very well off. In any case, it
implies that a programme that offers food subsidies to a larger proportion of the
population than that classified as income-poor may be justified as addressing the
problem of malnutrition. This particular question has not been established, and
investigation of it is the objective of this paper.
Overall, it is clear that, in the context of this debate over the whittling down of one of
the oldest, most far-reaching food subsidy programmes in the world, it is important to
see if the new methods and new data used in this study can throw any light on the actual
effects of the PDS on child malnutrition and, thereby, contribute to reconsideration of
its benefits.
6 Research has established that the distribution of cereal consumption and calorie intake across the
Indian states is not correlated with foodgrain production (except in drought years) but with the
distribution of purchasing power and physical access to food (Suryanarayana 1996). This differs
remarkably across states with Kerala having a very dense network of fair price shops in rural and
urban regions and less well-governed states like Bihar having no shop in most villages.8
Table 3
Participation in PDS: by state & income group
# households % PDS users % subsidy pov.rank % poor
Andhra 2100 64.0 13.0 15 21.9
Assam 1233 (NE)* 21.6 (NE)* 4.3 5 41.1
Bihar 2155 5.6 4.5 1 55.2
Gujarat 1606 47.5 3.6 14 24.2
Haryana 1722 9.4 2.7 12 25.2
Himachal 1225 75.2 10 28.6
Karnataka 2523 69.9 5.7 9 32.9
Kerala 1474 76.1 9.5 13 25.1
Madhya 4162 33.9 3.9 3 42.5
Maharashtra 2765 2.3 7.6 6 36.8
Orissa 1971 5.2 3.1 2 48.6
Punjab 1303 6.4 2.0 16 11.5
Rajasthan 1984 24.3 4.8 11 27.5
Tamil 1456 81.0 6.2 8 35.4
Uttar 4036 4.3 7.7 4 41.2
West Bengal 1515 9.4 7.1 7 36.9
All India 33230 34.6 100 - 36.1
Sources: Columns 1 and 2: Human Development Report, India and author’s own calculations based on
NCAER, 1994. Column 3: Performance Budgets of FCI (reported in Radhakrishnan and
Subbarao 1997, Table 3.4). Column 5 has the head count index for rural and urban areas
combined, from World Bank (1997, Annex 1, Table 1) and column 4 is based on column 5.
6 Previous research
6.1. On the Indian PDS
There is no existing research that attempts to analyse the impact of the Indian Public
Distribution System on childhood malnutrition. Previous research on the PDS in India
has been concerned with its inflationary consequences, its administration, and its
correlation with poverty. Particular questions investigated include regional variations in
the supply of foodgrains through the PDS (Tyagi 1990), urban bias (Howes and Jha
1990), targeting (Jha 1991, Dev and Suryanarayana 1992), and the growing cost of the
food subsidy (e.g. World Bank 1998b).
The only studies that appear to investigate welfare effects of the PDS are Parikh (1994:
described in Section 5) and Radhakrishnan and Subbarao (1997). As the latter makes a
relatively careful attempt, it is considered in some detail. Both use the 1986–87 National9
Sample Survey data which provide information on open market and PDS prices and
expenditures for a range of commodities. These are microdata but both studies use these
data aggregated up to deciles of monthly per capita expenditure. Radhakrishna and
Subbarao (1997) compute the income gain for users of the PDS as the product of the
quantity purchased from the PDS and the price differential between the open market and
the PDS. In per capita terms, this is estimated to be Rs. 2.01 per month or 2.7 per cent of
per capita expenditure for the rural poor, and Rs. 3.4 or 3.2 per cent of p.c. expenditure
for the urban poor. In absolute (rupee) terms, the income gain was marginally larger for
the rich. They use income elasticities of calories estimated by decile in Radhakrishna
and Ravi (1990) to translate the income gains into increases in calorie intake associated
with the PDS. Given that the poor have higher calorie-income elasticities, these gains
are larger for the poor than the non-poor. Moreover, these averages hide enormous
variations across states as well as significant variations across commodities sold on the
PDS. About 84 per cent of the income gain for the rural poor was on account of rice,
sugar and clothing, the per unit subsidy on wheat being about 10 per cent as compared
with a per unit subsidy on rice, for example, of about 35 per cent. Amongst states,
average income and calorie gains were considerably greater in Kerala, Andhra,
Karnataka and Gujarat than in the poorer states of Bihar, Orissa and UP. So, for
instance, the income gain associated with PDS rice purchases in Kerala is Rs. 5.4 per
capita per month for the poor and Rs. 4.7 for the non-poor, which is not inconsiderable.
The calorie gain for the very poor in Kerala (bottom 25 per cent of those under the
poverty line) associated with PDS use is 12 per cent (the corresponding all-India
average is 3 per cent).
6.2 On childhood malnutrition
Research on malnutrition has advanced in the last decade, with the appearance of micro-
data for developing countries that contain information on child height and weight,
thought to be robust indicators of health and longevity (see Strauss and Thomas 1995,
1998). A brief survey of this research is contained in Bhalotra (2002). For our current
purposes, what is relevant is that much of this research attempts to explain individual
variation in heights and weights of children in terms of household income and a range
of community variables. There is no consensus on whether income or food expenditure
improves health or not, contrary to the common presumption that they do (see Behrman
and Deolalikar 1987). This may reflect variations across regions in its effect, or
statistical problems of model specification. This question is investigated here for Indian
data.
7 Contributions of this study
Although the question of whether the PDS is any good for the poor is at the very heart
of fairly radical changes in progress in India today, the analyses done so far are not
rigorous and therefore not conclusive. Since questions of distribution are key to this
debate, the use of regional data in existing research on the PDS is a limitation. This is
redressed in this paper, which uses a household survey conducted in 1994. This will
permit us to allow for differences in household behaviour within regions, including
differences between rich and poor households in a region. The paper attempts to control
for the possible endogeneity of programme placement. In contrast to previous research10
which has only tabulated participation rates by income group or computed income gains
from observed prices and quantities, the current analysis is more behavioural. It uses a
wealth of socio-economic data available for both participating and non-participating
households in a multivariate analysis that permits estimation of conditional effects of
policy interest. It allows for and estimates the rise in food expenditures (encompassing
quantity and quality increases) in response to the food subsidy: there are no estimates of
this in the literature. The paper departs from any other work in this area in modelling the
within-household distribution of food and any PDS-related food gains. It is now well-
documented that there are systematic differences in poverty in India between men and
women, adults and children, and ‘high’ and ‘low’ castes. The third step of the analysis
investigates how the increase in food purchases stimulated by the food subsidy
translates into health status for children of both genders. Some of the advantages of
studying programme effects on a sensitive index of human development such as child
malnutrition are highlighted in Section 9.1. A linked analysis of this sort is useful in
identifying where in the chain policy fails if it does fail.
8 The data and description
The relevant previous research on the PDS referred to in Section 6 has used National
Sample Survey data for 1986–87. While this and a more recent NSS survey contain
valuable micro-data on the PDS and deserve further analysis, the NSS is not suitable for
this study as it does not have information on child malnutrition. I propose to investigate
these questions using the data collected in 1994 by the National Council of Applied
Economic Research (NCAER) that covered 34000 rural households. This survey formed
the basis of the India Human Development Report (Shariff 1999). It asked respondents
whether the household had bought any cereal on the PDS in the month before the
survey. It then asked what quantities of a few basic foods were bought on the PDS and
what problems, if any, households faced in using the PDS. There are also detailed data
on heights and weights of children under twelve, which permit construction of
anthropometric measures of malnutrition. Other relevant variables in the data include
household income, household demographics, parental characteristics and indicators of
community infrastructure.
Table 3 presents information on the percentage of (rural) households in the NCAER
survey that report having bought some grain on the PDS. The average is only 35 per
cent and there is considerable inter-state variation. It also reports the subsidy cost to the
government by state, and shows that the state dispersion of participation rates is not
closely related to poverty incidence (see the discussion in Section 5). Overall
participation rates, including urban areas, are in Table 4, where it is clear that average
participation is much higher in the PDS than in some of the other major welfare
programmes in India. The marginal odds of participation (defined in Table 4) in the
PDS are, however, similar across programmes (see Lanjouw and Ravallion 1998). State-
wise data on three anthropometric indicators of malnutrition (defined in Section 9.1) are
presented in Table 5. Using the commonly-used reference population of healthy
children in the US, our data suggest that 63 per cent are stunted, 29 per cent have low
weight for age and 10 per cent are wasted (definitions in Section 9.1). As with PDS-
usage, there is enormous inter-state variation. An interesting fact about these
malnutrition data for rural India is that they do not exhibit an income gradient: the
incidence of malnutrition was computed by income quintile and there was no significant
tendency for it to decline with income (data not shown).11
Table 4
Participation rates in India’s main anti-poverty programmes
Rural India, 1993–94
PDS Public works IRDP
Quintile Partic rate MOP Partic rate MOP Partic rate MOP
Poorest 69.5 1.06 5.0 1.16 6.5 1.11
2
nd 76.7 0.99 4.6 0.93 7.1 1.28
3
rd 77.9 0.91 4.2 0.80 6.4 1.21
4
th 78.1 0.86 3.5 0.92 6.0 0.96
5
th 76.1 0.81 3.4 0.55 5.6 0.39
Source: World Bank (1997, Tables 4.2 and 4.3). The data are based upon the 1993–94 NSS. The three
anti-poverty programmes compared are the PDS, Public Works Programmes and the Integrated
Rural Development Programme (IRDP). Column 1 refers to quintiles of the distribution of total
expenditure per capita. The participation rate is in percentages. MOP is the marginal odds of
participation. Let pqr denote the participation rate in the programme in quintile q and NSS-region r
and let ps denote the participation rate in the corresponding state, averaging over all quintiles
and regions. Then the MOP is estimated as dpqr/dps by running a simple regression. Since ps
includes or depends upon pqr, it is instrumented by a state average arrived at after excluding
region r and quintile q (see Lanjouw and Ravallion 1998).
Table 5
Incidence of malnutrition by state
Stunting Low weight for age State Number of
children
Wasting
(Intl.std.) Intl. std. Indian std. Intl. std. Indian std.
Andhra 3151 13.0 55.6 5.8 24.6 1.3
Bihar 4780 8.1 68.7 1.9 30.8 1.4
Gujarat 2766 13.0 69.2 7.6 39.3 3.2
Haryana 3835 8.4 64.8 1.5 28.1 0.4
Himachal 2056 4.4 66.3 2.1 20.6 0.2
Karnataka 4553 12.2 73.4 9.4 29.3 2.7
Kerala 2062 11.8 44.5 1.3 18.4 0.3
Maharashtra 4858 10.9 56.7 1.5 31.6 1.0
Madhya 8462 9.0 68.2 5.6 29.6 0.9
Orissa 3534 8.5 48.1 1.3 21.6 1.3
Punjab 2449 6.4 53.9 1.9 18.6 0.6
Rajasthan. 4706 8.7 61.0 3.1 29.8 1.8
Tamil 1999 7.1 58.6 1.9 26.3 0.8
Uttar 9016 13.9 63.5 1.8 32.9 1.7
Wbengal 3050 11.1 62.7 2.8 33.9 1.0
N-East 2575 6.8 71.9 10.2 25.5 1.3
All India 63852 10.0 63.1 3.7 28.9 1.312
9 Estimation
9.1 Anthropometric measures of malnutrition
This sub-Section defines anthropometric measures and considers their costs and benefits
relative to alternatives. Normalised body size has been shown to be a fairly robust
indicator of nutritional status. The commonly used measures are height for age
(stunting), weight for age (underweight) and weight for height (wasting). These are
often translated into z-scores by subtracting the median and dividing by the standard
deviation derived from a reference population of a given age and sex. We use a
reference population of healthy US children, which is the NCHS/WHO standard (this
choice is discussed in Section 9.2). Binary indicators of stunting, wasting and
underweight are defined by setting to unity observations for which z-scores fall two
standard deviations below the reference median. The choice amongst the three measures
depends upon the time horizon of interest, the age of the target group (height increases
most rapidly for children under two), and the form of nutritional deficiency
(calorie/micronutrient) that one is investigating. This choice can be crucial to the results
of the analysis since the correlation amongst the measures is often low (see
Micklewright and Ismail 2001). In this analysis we therefore report results for both
height-for-age which is a good measure of chronic malnutrition and weight-for-age
which picks up shorter-term undernourishment. We briefly indicate results for weight-
for-height but do not highlight these since research suggests that this measure is more
suitable for adults than for children (Micklewright and Ismail 2001).
An advantage of anthropometrics over alternative measures of welfare is that they refer
to the individual rather than the household. This is especially relevant in the current
context, where we would like to allow for gender differentials in child malnutrition. A
second benefit to anthropometrics is that they capture net nutritional status, whereas
measures like income make no allowance for the fact that the efficiency with which the
body converts food in to nutrition varies across individuals. Third, they seem preferable
to a calorie measure of nutrition. This is because malnutrition is consistent with calorie
adequacy, given inadequacy in protein or micro-nutrient intakes. For example,
Radhakrishnan and Subbarao (1997) observe that calorie intake levels are lower in the
Southern Indian states where the PDS has a better record, as compared with the
Northern states where the distribution network is relatively sparse. While this seems
counter-intuitive, they argue that it is most likely a reflection of dietary differences
between states, with people in the poorer Northern states deriving a greater proportion
of their calorie requirements from (cheaper) cereals. A fourth advantage of using
anthropometrics is that, in rural economies, accurate measurement of income is very
problematic whereas weighing and taking the height of a child would appear to be
relatively straightforward. Against these advantages, a difficulty with anthropometrics is
that they are subject to genetic and environmental influences. While averages for a
population are relatively robust, analysis of individual heights and weights as attempted
in this paper should attempt to control for these influences.
The survey used has data on community characteristics such as availability of safe water
and presence of sanitation schemes, on the structure and cleanliness of the house and on
literacy and other skills of parents. These are expected to control for environmental
influences. Unfortunately we do not have data on the heights and weights of parents,
which may be used to control for genetic endowments (see Thomas et al. 1990, for13
example). In principle, we could control for these as household-level unobservables by
using sibling fixed effects. As we are interested here in the effects of food expenditure
on child health and food expenditure would be wiped out in sibling-fixed-effects
estimation, this option cannot be pursued in the current context. Instead, we control for
ethnicity which we expect is likely to account for a large part of the genetic variation in
stature. A second potential problem with these data is that they display a non-monotonic
relation with welfare. However, in our sample of rural Indian households, this concern
is not substantially relevant, the problems of obesity tending to come in to play at rather
higher income levels than are observed here.
9.2 Other issues
The research strategy is described in Section 10. In this section, some general points
relating to estimation are discussed. The entire analysis is first conducted on the entire
sample of households and then on only the poorest 40 per cent. This will allow us to
observe whether the parameters of household food demand, son-preference and of
health production are different for the poor, and whether the impact of PDS use on child
health is any greater than amongst the non-poor. Our data show that the percentage of
poor and non-poor households using the PDS is similar on average but, given a village
with PDS-access, we may expect some self-selection out of the programme amongst the
non-poor (see footnote 5, Section 5). This may be on account of the poor quality of food
supplies available on the PDS or on account of the costs of having to queue at the shop.7
If the distribution of fair price shops and supplies under the PDS was systematically
associated with endogenous characteristics, our estimates would not be valid without
taking this into account. In principle, there was universal entitlement to the PDS until
1992 although, as indicated earlier, there were substantial differences across regions in
the reach of the system. Also, the data used were collected in 1994 and, as discussed in
Section 4, from 1992–94, there was an attempt to target geographically poor areas
within states. It may therefore be important to allow for endogeneity of programme
placement. This is done by estimating an auxiliary model that predicts access to the
PDS using exogenous variables. The identifying variables in the auxiliary equation are
state dummies, district-level poverty and inequality rates and village size.8 Why these?
As indicated earlier, there is considerable inter-state variation in the estimated
percentage of households reporting PDS use and this is likely to be a function of access.
On account of the tendency for poor districts to be remote, supplies to them may be
thinner. On the other hand, poorer districts may have qualified for greater support and
certainly did after 1992, so this effect could go either way. Inequality may influence the
political economy of programme placement. Village size appears to be an explicit
criterion for allocation of PDS resources (Suryanarayana 1996).
7 We could distinguish between self-selection of this sort and selection arising from differential
programme access by estimation of a double hurdle model. However, this is outside the scope of the
present study, and there is the problem of finding a sufficiently good instrument.
8 Distance of the village to the nearest town, an indicator of remoteness of the village and transport
costs associated with getting supplies there is a likely to be a good additional instrument but it is
unavailable in the NCAER. Future work merging the NCAER and Census data holds the potential of
exploiting this instrument as well as other useful information.14
The dependent variable of the auxiliary model is defined at the village level. It is zero if
less than 5 per cent of the households in the village reported using the PDS and unity
otherwise.9 Estimates of the auxiliary model are used to generate an estimate of the
inverse mills ratio and this is included in estimation of the Engel curve for food (see 1 in
Section 10.1). To see that this is effectively sample selection correction, refer to Section
10.1 where we describe our strategy as beginning with an estimate of an Engel curve on
the sample of PDS users. If the foodshare equation is different in slope and intercept for
users and non-users then we need to include a sample selection correction term in the
equation for users in order to predict the demand behaviour of non-users (Heckman
1974). This is exactly what we are doing when we construct the counter-factual posed
above: What would PDS users have spent on food if they had faced the same prices as
non-users?10
An alternative way of allowing for the fact that access to the PDS subsidy differed
widely across Indian regions is to produce state-specific estimates, the state being a
natural unit of disaggregation because state governments are responsible for conduct of
the PDS. This is done for selected states at the two ends of the distribution of poverty
and of PDS-usage.
In estimation of the food demand equation (Steps 1 and 2, Sections 10.1 and 10.2) as
well as in estimation of the health production function (Step 3, Section 10.3), issues of
endogeneity arise. These are discussed in context in Section 10. Food expenditure in the
health function is instrumented by an indicator for PDS-use. Income in both functions is
instrumented by land owned, which is assumed to be exogenous to the model on the
grounds that there is no very active market for land. Overidentifying restrictions
associated with parents education are investigated.
9 We define this indicator variable in terms of reported access of less than 5 per cent to allow for
measurement error and also to allow for the possibility that the village in question does have access in
principle but that actual access is very difficult for most (95 per cent) of households. In principle, the
dependent variable we have defined will pick up not only access (selection) but also self-selection. In
practice, it is unlikely that to be the case that a village has good PDS facilities (access) but that less
than 5 per cent of households choose to use it. It therefore seems reasonable to define access in this
way.
10 It may be useful to draw an analogy with the classical problem of estimating the effect of union-
membership on wages. If one believes that there is simply an intercept effect then it is enough to
include a union dummy in a pooled sample and to instrument it if it is thought that union membership
is endogenous to wages. This would be equivalent in our context to estimating an Engel curve on the
sample of all households with a dummy on the right hand side indicating whether the household
reported using the PDS or not. Returning to the union-wage case, if one believes that union
membership influences not only the intercept but all slopes in the wage model, then a sample selection
model is appropriate. In this case, the sample is split into union and non-union workers and a wage
equation estimated for each. To allow for the fact that each sub-sample is non-random (or that union-
membership is endogenous), an auxiliary model describing the determination of union status is
estimated and an inverse mills ratio based on this is included in the wage model. The parallel with our
context is clear: We prefer the more general assumption that the food demand equation for PDS users
may have not only a different intercept but also different slopes than that for non-users. So we split the
sample. If PDS-access is non-random (or if programme placement is endogenous) then we need an
auxiliary model determining PDS access. Using this, we introduce a sample selection correction factor
into the Engel equation for food.15
Although anthropometric data are available for children under 12, we restrict the
analysis in Step 3 to children under 8, in view of WHO guidelines on the usefulness of
anthropometric indicators by age. In order to allow for biological differences in the
growth path by age and gender, a full set of dummies interacting age and gender of the
index child is included amongst the regressors. I also estimate separate equations by
gender as girls and boys may have different health production functions for biological
reasons (see Duraisamy and Duraisamy 1995 for India and Hill and Upchurch 1995 for
studies of gender differences in health functions in a number of developing countries).
Almost all previous studies of child health use the NCHS/WHO reference population
which is of healthy children in the USA. If healthy Indian children are shorter or lighter
for genetic/ethnic reasons then z-scores obtained by normalization on the parameters of
a US population will tend to over-estimate the incidence of malnutrition in India. In
Table 5, we have computed the incidence of malnutrition using the median and standard
deviation in the sample. Unsurprisingly, we get much smaller estimates. This sample of
rural households is, of course, not the correct reference group since it definitely contains
some malnourished children: the figures are merely illustrative. What is important for
the current analysis, is to recognise that the question of which reference group is used is
not such an issue. Let us write the z-score for indicator X as (X-￿)/￿,w h e r e￿ and ￿ are
the mean and standard deviation of the reference population. These parameters are
constants for a given age and sex of the child. The z-score is the dependent variable in
Step 3. Rewriting the z-score as (X/￿)-(￿/￿), it is clear that (￿/￿) is a constant the size of
which is irrelevant once we have put in a full set of age-gender dummies on the right
hand side of the model. The term (X/￿) involves deflation of X by an age-gender-
specific ￿ and now the population from which ￿ comes is not entirely irrelevant.
However, if we are willing to assume that the standard deviation of the reference
population actually used (the NCHS/WHO) is a constant multiple of the standard
deviation of the true population (whichever that may be) at every age and sex, then
again the use of the NCHS/WHO standard becomes completely innocuous. A way of
freeing the estimates entirely of any relation to the choice of standard would be to allow
every regressor to be interacted with age and sex dummies. We do not take this route as
this level of generality seems unnecessary.
10 Research strategy
In order to conduct a systematic investigation of the effects of the PDS food subsidy on
child malnutrition we address the following three questions.
10.1 Step 1: Does the food subsidy result in higher purchases of food?
This question is not straightforward to answer because we do not have market and PDS
prices and quantities. We do, however, have data on household expenditure on food and
on some of its components, an indicator for whether the household buys any cereal on
the PDS, income, demographic, and other characteristics of households. So we estimate
an Engel curve for consumers who do not use the PDS and use the estimates to
construct the counter-factual: what would PDS-users have purchased if they did not face
a subsidy? Comparing this with observed purchases gives us an estimate of the increase
in food purchases associated with the PDS.16
The main equation modelling food demand is specified as a Working-Leser Engel
curve:
(1) w =F ( y )+an+Sk gk(Nk/N) + j
Tz+dl + n
where w is household foodshare (share of food expenditures in total expenditures), y is
log household income, F is a quadratic function, n is log household size, Nki/Ni are a
vector of k variables reflecting the age-gender composition of the household, and z are
other relevant controls. l is the inverse Mills ratio, a correction factor for (village-level)
PDS access. This is obtained from probit estimates of an auxiliary model which
describes village-level access as a function of a set of instruments and all exogenous
variables in (1). Further discussion of this appears below.
The aim of the exercise is to estimate the increase in the quantity (and quality) of food
consumed by households in rural India that is associated with the price subsidy. This is
done as follows.
i) Equation (1) is estimated on the sample of non-users. Given the selection
correction (or programme placement) term l, these estimates can be used to
predict consumption for the sample of PDS users. This is what PDS users
would spend on food if they did not have a subsidy. Let this be wno-subsidy.
ii) Given that users do enjoy a subsidy (call this b), they can buy a food basket
with the same quantities and composition of foods with an expenditure of
(1-b)wno-subsidy.
iii) We observe that they spend wactual.
iv) The difference between wactual and (1-b)wno-subsidy denotes the increase in
quantity (or quality/mix) of food that they choose upon receiving the subsidy.
S e eF i g u r e1 .
The intention of the subsidy is to get people who cannot afford to meet food needs to be
able to do so. If we find that lowering the price of food does not result in higher food
purchases, then we may infer that the households being subsidised are not very poor,
that is, they are not ‘hungry’ households.11 In this case, food purchases under the PDS
may simply be substituting for food purchases on the open market. Alternatively, the
quality of food offered on the PDS may be so low as to discourage purchase, or access
of the poor to the PDS may be very limited. Overall, the estimated obtained in Step 1
indicate the impact of the PDS on food security.
10.2 Step 2. Allocation of food and the food subsidy within households
Food purchased by the household may be distributed unequally amongst its members. In
particular, there is considerable evidence that women and girls are disadvantaged in
India and that this disadvantage may stem from differential treatment within the
11 To the extent that consumers buy a fraction of their grain on the PDS and the rest on the open market,
the marginal price is the open market price and this is no different for users and non-users. In this
case, any increase in food expenditure associated with PDS-use represents an income effect.17
household (e.g. Chen et al. 1981, Harriss 1990). In this case, interventions aimed at
providing food security may have to be re-designed to target individuals rather than
households. For example, children could be offered free school meals.12 In order to
investigate any differences in food allocation as between boys and girls of similar ages,
an Engel curve is estimated on the full sample and we allow interactions of every
regressor with an indicator variable for PDS-use (denoted I).
(2) wi =F ( y i)+ani + Sk gk(Nki/Ni)+ z ij + dli +
I*F0(yi)+a0 I*ni + Sk gk0I*(Nki/Ni)+ ( I * z I)j0 + d0 I*li +nI
The notation in (2) is the same as that in (1). If the coefficient on the k
th variable is gk,
then the change in foodshare upon replacing a person in the suppressed group
(suppressed on account of collinearity) with a person from the kth group, holding
constant total household size, is gk/N. Estimates of (2) can be used to compare the
coefficients on proportions of girls and boys in the household (of specified age groups)
for households that are and are not on the PDS (i.e. compare gk and gk0 for boys and
girls).
10.3 Step 3. Is food inadequacy an important determinant of child malnutrition?
Intuition would suggest that food (or income) is an important determinant of nutritional
status, especially in a country in which a third of the population lives below the poverty
line and two-thirds of all children under five may be classed as malnourished. However,
the evidence from other studies is mixed (see Section 6.2). The finding of small or
insignificant effects may be spurious if good instruments are unavailable since both
income and (food) expenditure are often measured with error and this is known to
generate a downward bias. Small expenditure effects may be genuine when critical food
needs have been met or else when higher food expenditures do not translate into more
nutritious consumption (see Behrman and Deolalikar 1989). A third possible
explanation of small effects flowing from income or food expenditure is that the
effectiveness of these inputs in producing health relies upon the absence of disease. For
example, a child with diarrhoea may be unable to hold down nutrients. As such,
complementary investments in clean water and sanitation may be necessary to generate
payoffs to food subsidies. In general, malnutrition indicators compound the effects of
food quantity and quality, disease, and genetic endowments. An important empirical
research question is therefore to estimate the size of the effect of food expenditure on
nutritional status. This will complete the investigation of the effects of the PDS food
subsidy on nutritional status.
We estimate the health production function:
z-score(X)ijks = f(ln foodjks, ln p.c.incomejks,C ijks,H jks,Vks,Z s, eijks)
12 This raises the potential for parents to reduce food given to the child at home in the knowledge that
the child has had a meal at school: a case of crowding-out of private by public expenditure. However,
it is likely to be an improvement on a subsidy offered bluntly to the household.18
where X is an anthropometric indicator for individual i in household j in village k in
state s, C are child characteristics, H are household characteristics, V are village
variables, Z are state dummies and e is a random term. The key variable of interest is
household-level expenditure on food (ln foodjks). We also investigate any additional
effects of household income (ln p.c.incomejks) which may arise, for example, by virtue
of access to sanitation and medicines increasing in income. The potential endogeneity of
food expenditure is allowed for by instrumenting it with an indicator variable for PDS
use. When used as a regressor, income is instrumented by land owned, which is
assumed to be exogenous to the model. Overidentifying restrictions associated with
parents education are investigated.
The data we use has the advantage of offering an unusually rich set of control variables.
In addition to food expenditure and income, a further variable denoting household
resources that is investigated is the number of adults in the household.13 The relevant
child-specific characteristics in the data include age, gender and birth-order, (and
interactions thereof). We also include indicators of early feeding of the child (age till
breastfeeding and age at which solid foods were introduced), of the child’s health
endowment (age of mother at child-birth), indicators of mother’s ‘ability’ (educational
level, whether she reads the newspaper, and whether she has knowledge of diarrhoea
treatments), father’s ability (his education, whether he reads the newspaper), indicators
of environmental factors that might determine vulnerability to disease at the household
level (whether mother and father smoke, whether kitchen and toilet in the house are
clean, whether house is pucca, i.e. of robust material), and also at the village level
(indicators of sanitation and health schemes and of public goods including access to
clinics), village-level demographics (age-gender composition of population including
‘female status’ measured as the ratio of women to men in the village), and a measure of
genetic endowments that may influence stature (ethnic group).
11 Results
This section discusses the results in the three steps outlined in the Methods section. It
first addresses the questions central to this research. It then points to some other
interesting findings that emerge from the estimated equations.
11.1 Does the PDS subsidy result in greater spending on food?
Estimates of the Engel curve for households that do not use the PDS (Equation 1) were
obtained, taking into account differential access to the PDS. The selection correction
term allows the parameters of food demand to be different for households that do and do
not use the PDS. The instruments in the auxiliary model were jointly highly significant.
The mean predicted foodshare of PDS users is 50.9 per cent (wno-subsidy). It turns out that
this is not significantly different from the actual mean foodshare of this group, which is
50.5 per cent (wactual). Distinguishing the sample of households with incomes in the
bottom 40 per cent of the distribution does not alter this result: their actual and their
13 The number of children is not included because fertility and child quality (including child health) are
codetermined in a Beckerian framework.19
predicted foodshare is 67 per cent. Distinguishing cereals and pulses from other foods
also does not alter this result. The actual budget-share of cereals and pulses for PDS-
users is 39 per cent and the predicted share is 41 per cent.
In terms of Figure 1, this suggests that curves a and c happen to coincide. The additional
expenditure on food associated with the subsidy is given by the vertical distance
between curves b and c. In our data, this is the distance between curves b and a, which
is the unit subsidy, b (see the Methods section). So if PDS prices are 23 per cent lower
than market prices, then our data indicate that PDS users buy 23 per cent more food.
This is why their observed food expenditure (the product of a lower price and a higher
quantity) is the same as the expenditure they would incur without a subsidy.14 Thus, our
estimates indicate that, on average, the subsidy translates entirely in to more (or better)
food. It is important to note that we can make this inference without knowing the value
of b.
What is the value of b? This is a difficult question. PDS prices vary by state and open
market prices vary by centres within each state and the relevant data are not readily
available for the country as a whole for every year. PDS and open market prices for the
year 1986–87 are reported for rural and urban areas for every Indian state for rice and
wheat separately in Radhakrishna and Subbarao (1997), based on NSS data. A simple
average for all-India suggests b=0.23 or that the PDS price is 77 per cent of the open
market price. The price ratios are reproduced in Table 6, where we also present
predicted and actual foodshares of PDS users from our data. These predictions are from
an equation in which data is pooled across the states. The purpose of Table 7 is not only
to show the reader the level and variation of the PDS-subsidy (b) across the Indian
states but also to show that, at any given b, the extent to which the subsidy results in
higher food expenditure varies across states.15 Consider Andhra Pradesh, a Southern
rice-eating state (refer to Table 7). The foodshare predicted for users of the PDS in the
absence of a subsidy is 60 per cent. Given that the cost of rice on the PDS is 64 per cent
that on the open market, their foodshare with this subsidy would fall to 38 per cent
(0.64*0.60). Since we observe that the actual foodshare of this group is 54 per cent, we
can infer that a unit subsidy of 26 per cent stimulates a 16 per cent point increase in
food purchases.16 Looking down the rows of Table 7, it is evident that, in every state,
PDS use is associated with a positive increase in food purchased.
14 There is not a lot of variation in quality in the food items available on the PDS. However the PDS user
often buys some food on the PDS and some on the open market. The subsidy accruing to the user
through purchases on the PDS may result, as we suggest in more food being bought, whether on the
PDS or the open market. However, it is recognized that the additional expenditure on food could also
involve changes in composition and quality (e.g. a higher ratio of protein to cereal). What is
interesting from our perspective is that the extra spending is on food and not on clothes, ceremonies,
or something else. We can safely conclude that the food subsidy does improve food security if this is
understood to mean a greater realised demand for food quantity or quality, both of which may be
expected to generate health improvements.
15 In other words, curves a and c coincide for India as a whole but, for many states, the predicted food
share deviates considerably from the actual foodshare.
16 This analysis assumes that if a household reports buying any cereal on the PDS then it buys all its
cereal on the PDS. Suppose that this is not true but that the household buys only a fraction p of its
cereal on the PDS. Then b will be replaced by pb in this discussion. The spirit of the argument is
unchanged.20
Table 6
Actual and predicted foodshares by state
& price subsidy rates on rice and wheat
Foodshares Subsidy
Actual Predicted (1-b)rice (1-b)wheat
Andhra 0.54 0.60 0.64 0.76
Assam 0.53 0.55 0.66 0.25
Bihar 0.35 0.47 0.83 0.78
Gujarat 0.55 0.62 0.60 0.71
Haryana 0.46 0.49 0.75
Himachal 0.62 0.75
J&Kashmir 0.77 0.95
Karnataka 0.54 0.65 0.60 0.64
Kerala 0.49 0.55 0.66 0.73
Madhya 0.48 0.52 0.77 0.97
Maharashtra 0.45 0.48 0.88 0.79
Orissa 0.54 0.59 0.89 0.97
Punjab 0.56 0.68 1.04
Rajasthan 0.54 0.68 0.66 0.80
Tamil Nadu 0.50 0.63 0.61 0.76
Uttar Pradesh 0.55 0.69 0.97 1.07
West Bengal 0.68 0.86 0.76 0.83
Simple Average 0.74 0.80
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 are the actual and the predicted foodshares estimated by the author from the
1994 NCAER survey of rural households. These are predictions from a single equation that
pools data across states. Predictions from state-specific equations in which all slopes are treated
as heterogeneous are discussed in the text. The figures in columns 3 and 4 are the ratios of the
PDS price to the open market price for rural areas of each state in the year 1986–87. These are
obtained from Radhakrishna and Subbarao (1997).
We also estimated state-specific equations for selected states that allow complete
heterogeneity in the parameters of the Engel curve by state. The actual and predicted
shares were as follows: 26 per cent and 28 per cent in Kerala, 41 per cent and 42 per
cent in Andhra, 33 per cent and 38 per cent in Bihar and 42 per cent and 50 per cent in
UP.
11.2 Is the additional spending on food distributed equally amongst boys and
girls?
We also obtained estimates of an Engel curve estimated on all households in which
every regressor is interacted with an indicator for whether the household participates in
the PDS (Equation 2). Our estimates are consistent with the view that boys and girls21
aged 0–12 have equal claims on food, irrespective of whether the household is on the
PDS or not. Both boys and girls get a slightly larger share of food amongst households
that use the PDS but the difference is not significant. Amongst 0–6 year olds, boys in
PDS-using households claim a higher foodshare than girls but, again, the difference is
not significant. In particular, amongst households that do not use the PDS, replacing an
adult male with a child in the 0–6 year age range results in a decrease in foodshare of
0.024 for boys and girls. The corresponding figure for 7–12 year olds is 0.014. Amongst
households on the PDS, the ratio of child to adult consumption is larger, these numbers
being 0.016 for boys and 0.021 for girls, which also indicates some ‘preference’ for
boys. However the coefficients on the terms of interaction with PDS-use are not
significantly different. We therefore cannot reject the hypothesis that any additional
spending on food is distributed equally amongst boys and girls. This result is unchanged
when the sample is restricted to the poorest 40 per cent of households.17
11.3 Do higher food expenditures at the household level improve child
nutritional status?
This question is addressed by estimating a health production function in which
household food expenditure appears as an explanatory variable (see the Methods section
and the section on anthropometrics). First consider results for the child’s height for age.
The main result is that, at given levels of household income, higher food expenditures
are associated with significantly better child nutritional status. This effect is not very
large. An increase in food expenditures of 23 per cent predicts an increase in child
height of 0.09 standard deviations (at a given age and sex). The level of income itself is
insignificant. As households will tend to smooth consumption and especially food
consumption, food consumption will be a better descriptor of the long run welfare of the
household than income. Income in rural households is very volatile and also more likely
than food expenditure to be mis-measured. This may explain the insignificance of
income. Alternatively, these results may simply be read as saying that income that is not
spent for food has no effect on child health. There is no direct effect of gender on child
height. The set of age and state dummies is very significant.
When the full set of individual, household and community characteristics indicated in
Section 10.3 are included, food expenditure remains significant. Some of the control
variables are interesting in themselves, and these are discussed in the following sub-
Section. The same specification was estimated on a sample restricted to households in
the bottom 40 per cent of the income distribution. The effect of food expenditures on
health was still significant but smaller. This may reflect the fact that the translation of
food consumption in to child health depends upon complementary factors such as
maternal ability, information, or hygienic living conditions which are less available in
poor households.18 Although the gender dummy is insignificant in these models, gender
may nevertheless have slope effects. This was investigated by separating the samples of
boys and girls. There are some significant differences in slope. Food spending remains a
17 It may be of interest to note that the Engel curve for the poor is downward sloping and concave to the
origin while that for the whole sample is downward sloping and convex to the origin.
18 A smaller marginal effect of food expenditure on child health amongst poor as opposed to non-poor
households is unlikely to be explained by the lower nutritional quality of food purchased by the poor
because quality should be reflected in prices and therefore in expenditures.22
significant determinant of height but the effect is (just) significantly higher for boys
than for girls.
Estimates of the determinants of child weight-for-age are even more different as
between boys and girls. Food expenditures have a significant positive effect at given
levels of income for both boys and girls, the effect being somewhat larger and more
robust for boys than for girls. Household income has no relation to girl weight but has a
significant non-linear effect on boys’ weight. At low income levels, an increase in
income generates a reduction in weight which may reflect a diversification in diet away
from cereal alone. However, at higher levels of income, increments in income are
associated with weight gains. This is a plausible pattern. It should be emphasized that
our measure is of current rather than permanent income and that child weight is a
current or short-term measure of nutritional status.
Child weight-for-height was also investigated, although the results are not reported in
any detail as this is not such a meaningful measure for children. There are no significant
gender differences here. Food expenditure takes a positive sign but the effect is not
robust. Income is insignficant.
We also investigated including medical expenditure as a regressor. This has a
significant but small positive effect on child height for age in the pooled sample.
Separating genders reveals that the positive effect of household medical expenditures is
significant (with a coefficient of 0.03) only for boys, being completely insignificant for
girls. This is consistent with research on gender differentials in child welfare that argues
that it is in health care and expenditure that parents exercise some relative neglect of
girls (e.g. Basu 1989). In the weight-for age equation, medical expenditures display a
negative association with the weight of boys, which is odd and might suggest reverse
causality. There is no effect for girls. In the weight-for-height equation, medical
expenditures are not significant for boys but are significant for girls once the full range
of control variables is included in the model.
Our main conclusions are that we find a robust effect of food expenditures on child
height and weight given food expenditures, income is unrelated to height for both boys
and girls. It is unrelated to the weight of girls, and has a significant and non-linear
association with the weight of boys.
11.4 Other results
The discussion has focused so far on the precise questions set out in the Methods
section. This section summarises other results of interest. Evaluated at sample means,
the income elasticity of food expenditures is 0.38 for PDS users and an insignificantly
different 0.35 for non-users. It is 0.39 for poor users (defined as the bottom 40 per cent
of the income distribution) and it is 0.50 for poor non-users. The estimation was done
again for the expenditure share of cereals and pulses and other foods rather than for
food expenditure as a whole. These estimates produce an elasticity of 0.14 for cereals
and pulses and of 0.94 for other foods. The average for all-food conceals a fairly
dramatic difference in expenditure responses for ‘necessities’ versus more diverse
elements of the food basket.23
Somewhat puzzling but consistent with estimates of Engel curves for several other
developing countries (see Bhalotra and Attfield 1998, Deaton and Paxson 1998), there
are sizeable scale economies in food expenditure. The coefficients on the set of
variables describing the age-gender composition of the household are plausible,
revealing lower consumption amongst children than amongst adults and gender
differentials restricted to adults.
Table 7
Quick summary of significant determinants of health outcomes by gender
Height Weight
boys girls boys girls
Food expenditure 0.29 0.19 0.16 0.12
+
Med expenditure 0.02 n.s. n.s. n.s.
Food exp * PDS n.s. 0.02
Income (quadratic) n.s. n.s. -0.07 n.s.
Birth-order 0.17 0.15 0.08 0.08
Age to breastfeeding 0.07 n.s. -0.04
+ -0.05
+
Age start solids n.s. n.s. n.s. -0.03
Age (ma) at birth 0.02 0.02 0.014 0.007
Ma smokes -0.20 n.s. -0.09 n.s.
Ma education
+ prim mid n.s. n.s.
Ma news 0.17 n.s.
Ma knows ORS 0.07 n.s.
Pa smokes -0.15 n.s. -0.09 n.s.
Pa education n.s. n.s. n.s. mid
Pa news n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.09
Clean house 0.25 0.29
Pucca house n.s. n.s. 0.09 n.s.
Water potable sig Sig n.s. n.s.
Water scheme n.s. 0.21 n.s. n.s.
Health scheme 0.19 0.26 n.s. n.s.
Road sig Sig sig n.s.
Ethnic group -(xian) +(ST) -(xian) n.s.
State dum sig Sig sig sig
State dum*PDS Sig Sig sig sig
R
2 0.08 0.09
Only significant coefficients are displayed.
Variables which are insignificant across an entire row are not shown.24
We found that food expenditure has a significantly positive effect on height and weight
for age for both boys and girls under the age of eight. We have also reported finding
generally insignificant effects of income and unstable effects of medical expenditures
on child health, holding food expenditure constant. The effects of other variables are
summarized in Table 7. Birth order has a significantly positive effect on health,
indicating that first-born children are stronger, possibly because resource competition
disfavours younger siblings. Mother’s age at birth has a positive effect on child health
and there is a negative effect associated with the mother smoking. Mother’s educational
level has a positive effect on child height but no effect on weight. Mother’s that read
newspapers often and also mother’s that have knowledge of the oral rehydration therapy
recommended for diarrhea have healthier sons by the weight criterion but there is no
significant effect on the weight of girls. The height and the weight of sons suffers if the
father smokes but there is no such effect for girls. Newspaper reading on the part of the
father has a positive influence on the weight of daughters but no effect on sons and no
effect on height. Living in a clean house significantly increases height but has no effect
on weight. The presence of water and health schemes in the village has a positive
influence on height but not on weight. The ethnic dummies included to allow for
possible genetic variation in stature between ethnic groups are significant. Many of the
variables not explicitly mentioned here but included as potential regressors (and listed in
Section 10.3) were insignificant.
12 Conclusions
This paper illuminates two very different concerns of immediate relevance to policy
reform in the context of human development in India by analysing the determinants of
child malnutrition and by evaluating, in this context, the benefits of the food subsidy
carried by the PDS. The most striking result is that the entire food subsidy appears to be
spent on increases in food quantity (or quality). We find no evidence of significant
gender differences amongst children in the allocation of food or the food subsidy. Food
expenditures have a significant impact on child health, whether measured as height or
weight for age. Given food expenditure, income has no significant effect. The impact of
food expenditure on child health tends to be larger for boys than girls and larger
amongst the non-poor than amongst the poor.
The results are linked as follows. If the average subsidy for the average household on
the PDS is 23 per cent (which is what the data suggest), then our findings indicate that
the PDS-using household buys 23 per cent more food (step 1). The additional
expenditure on food translates, on average, into statistically significant increases of 0.09
standard deviations in height and 0.05 standard deviations in weight for boys, and into
smaller increases for girls (step 3). Gender differences appear not in the allocation of
food expenditure but in the conversion of this into health and also in the effects of other
covariates on health (steps 2 & 3). Overall, we conclude that the PDS has a significantly
positive effect on childhood nutritional status, although the size of this effect is small.25
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Curve a denotes estimates for the non-PDS sample and
predictions for the PDS sample. Curves b and c refer to the
PDS sample alone. Curve b lies below a by the (%) amount
of the subsidy. Curve c plots the actual data for PDS users.1